The definition of covert action specifically excludes traditional military activities and routine support to such activities. Routine support to traditional military activities can be provided under either Title 10 or Title 50, but does not require a Presidential Finding. However, were DoD to attempt to conduct operations to influence political, ec

Furthermore, there is an entire legal and regulatory structure that has been established and refined over the decades to ensure that covert action is conducted by CIA, supervised by the NSC, and overseen by the congressional intelligence committees. A significant shift (like the one proposed for a new OSS) would require congressional acquiescence a

action responsibilities to agencies other than CIA when appropriate. They cite the fact that President John F. Kennedy relied on this authority when transferring certain covert operations in Southeast Asia from CIA to DoD. Reform advocates argue that this precedent, updated for the 21st century, could help reduce duplication, align resources more e

of command provides a political and operational buffer that reduces the risk of escalation, overt military entanglement, and the loss of strategic flexibility. Advocates for the current model also point out that CIA has proven itself adaptable to modern warfare, remaining responsive to the National Security Council (NSC), subject to rigorous congre

within Iran and within strike range of Israeli Defense Force (IDF) targets, facilitating accurate, rapid, and efficient strikes to targets by the Israeli Air Force. This demonstrates how new warfare tactics can yield strategic effects, especially when employed as shaping operations for conventional forces. Legislation’s Role in Hybrid Warfare Str